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beauty - entails dualism and dualism is a false position. F ew people will deny that
dualism is false, but dualism may be a red h erring here . Perhaps the point at issue
re ally concerns the extent to which the human biological body as we know it is an
intrinsic good of a human person. It appears that for Grisez and Boyle the cover·
age extends to the entire biological body: arms and legs, heart and lungs. The
compelling quality of their account may not be seen or felt , however, as one looks
for the intrinsic good in the total human biological body of the self-respirating but
brain-damaged person who is living out his life in an irreversible comatose state.
The service that Grisez and Boyle provide to the pro-life movement through
Life and Death with Liberty and Justice should be reiterated. It will surely be
advantageous for furthering pro-life objectives if people within the movement give
the book the careful study it deserves.
- Patrick J. Coffey, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Marquette University

Principles of Biomedical Ethics
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress
Oxford University Press, New York, N. Y., 1979. x + 314 pp., $7. 95 (paper).
Principles of Biomedical Ethics is an innovative book. Until now , most efforts
to treat the full range of moral issues in medicine from the standpoint of a
systematic moral theory have been provided by authors writing in one of the
major theological traditions. This volume represents an attempt by moralists with
scholarly facility in 20th century philosophical ethics to construct a set of moral
principles for use in analyzing a broad spectrum of ethical dilemmas in health
care. The philosophical elegance of the principles is commendable. Somewhat less
satisfactory, however, is the manner in which the principles are applied to clinical
medicine. What the volume seems to lack is a firm sense for some important
philosophical lessons regarding the physician-patient relationship which clinical
experience provides.
The authors propose to examine medico-moral issues primarily from the perspective of four principles: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice.
Certain other principles, sometimes thought to be sui generis, are derived from
some member of this set. For example, the duty of veracity is derived from the
principle of autonomy. Autonomy requires consent by the patient or subject, and
"consent cannot express autonomy unless it is informed , and it therefore depends
on communication and ultimately on truthtelling" (p. 203). However, duties of
fidelity, which are also a significant feature of professional-patient relationships,
are created by voluntary actions such as the making of contracts. Oftentimes they
"hinge on the terms of the relationship itself rather than on external principles"
(p. 201). The various principles formulate prima facie duties - th ey indicate
duties that "are on all occasions binding unless they are in co n flict wi t h stronger
duties" (p. 45). Thus, the interpretation of principles, as well as some of their
content, derives from W. D. Ross.
Each of the centrally important middle chapters focuses u pon one of the four
major principles. In each case, the relevant principle is explicate d and then used to
examine bioethical issues to which it is deemed to be most relevant. Although the
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strategy is familiar , it raises some conceptual concern. If the important issues in
medicine are generated by a conflict in the de mands of competing principles,
might not the strategy result in a less·than·balanced treatment of competing moral
requirements?
The principle of autonomy is formulated in two moral rules. In regard to
self·regarding conduct, persons should be free to perform whatever actions they
wish. Moreover, in evaluating that conduct, we ought to respect them as persons
with the same right to their judgments as we have to our own (p. 59). Applying
the principle to the disclosure requirements for informed consent, the authors
suggest that "whatever a reasonable person would judge material to the decisionmaking process should be disclosed, and, in addition , any remaining information
material to an individual patient should be offered through a process of asking a
patient what else he or she wishes to know . . . " (p. 73). The criterion nicely
combines two prominent disclosure criteria discussed in the literature.
But the discussion fails to clarify the aim of the disclosure process, and conse·
quently , the role of the physician in it. On one hand , respect for autonomy may
require that the physician encourage the patient to determine for himself the
appropriate plan of treatment. On this model, the physician should be an informa·
tion provider only, seeking to elicit a decision from his patient on the basis of the
disclosed information. On the other hand, respect for autonomy may only require
that the physician be sure that his plans do not violate the patient's considered
wishes. On this model , the physician should offer a determinate recommendation
regarding treatment, using the informed consent proc ess to ensure that the patierit
does not object to what he proposes.
The authors seem to favor the former interpretation. They support Capron's
view that informed consent functions to promote autonomy and that it serves to
provide persons with "the right to make decisions affecting their lives" (p. 63).
They also suggest that informed consent serves to " promote individual thought
and initiative" (p. 64). But if we accept the first interpretation of what autonomy
requires, serious problems arise for the medical practitioner. Few patients wish to
actively choose a plan of treatment themselves. If asked to do so, they are
typically shocked, dismayed or confused. They prefer that the physician make the
decision, subject to their approval. At any rate , since it makes for a considerable
difference in the clinician 's role, the authors might have been clearer about the
demands placed upon the physician by the principle of autonomy in the informed
consent setting.
The discussion of nonmaleficence is used as the basis for a careful discussion of
decisions to withhold treatment for incompetents. Nonmaleficence is analyzed
into duties to avoid intentional harm to others, to protect them from unjustified
risk, and to exercise due care. Cases involving incompetents are classified into four
types, the most controversial being that in which the patient has the ability to
mentate, but no capacity to provide informed consent. This category includes
defective newborns. The authors suggest that treatment decisions for these
patients require a balancing of benefits and burdens for the patient. Although no
comprehensive guidelines are proposed, some conditions are suggested. Following
McCormick , it is claimed that unless a potential e xists for meaningful human
relationships, tre.atment is optional. Furthermore, m ental retardation is not a
legitimate consideration in deciding to withhold tre atment. Finally, only the
patient's interests should enter the calculation.
The discussion of decision·making procedures for incompetents is somewhat
less acceptable. It is correctly suggested that final decisions should reside with the
next of kin. But the role assigned to the physician is troublesome. Disagreeing with
Robert Veatch who would limit the physician to the role of an information
provider, the authors claim that the physician may "engage in moral discussions of
the options" with families (p. 129). This is a step in the right direction. But they
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fail to consider the significant clinical problem generated by families who are too
guilty , remorseful or unrealistically hopeful to propose discontinuation of treatment for their loved ones. Once this problem is recognized, the physician may
sometimes properly assume the task of firmly recommending the discontinuation
of treatment.
The principle of beneficence is claimed to require the provision of certain
minimal benefits and protection to each person, as well as the maximization of
the balance of benefits over burdens we are able to produce in our actions (the
latter requirement being the principle of utility, reduced to a prima facie duty).
The analysis of beneficence sets the stage for a thorough discussion of medical
paternalism - acting for a patient's good without his approval. The authors maintain that only "weak paternalism" is justified. That is, "to the extent one protects
a person from harms produced by causes beyond his knowledge and control, the
intervention has plausible claim to being morally justified, for his choices are
substantially non-voluntary" (p. 163). Where the patient acts voluntarily, paternalistic behavior ("strong paternalism") is never justified. Thus, it may be permissible to temporarily continue the chronic uremia patient on dialysis, contrary to
his stated wishes, if his refusal might be caused by the psychological effect of
toxins in his blood. For if this factor is operative, his decision is due to a cause
presently beyond his control.
A serious difficulty is that the authors concentrate almost exclusively on overriding a patient's expressed desires. However, paternalism might also involve the
control of information which we convey to patients, and the best case for strong
paternalism may relate to cases in the latter category . For example, a physician
may believe it better to tell his patient that his chance to survive his cancer is
"very guarded," rather than to say "it is less than 5%. " Again, a physician may
choose not to tell his patient that, within a few days, he will hemorrhage to death
from the tumor which is eroding the blood vessels in his duodenal wall . In one
case, a judgment is made that leaving some room for hope would be therapeutically best; in the other, that it would be cruel to tell the patient the grizzly details
of how he will die. Yet in each case, the patient might be better able to specify his
own wishes regarding care if the information were disclosed. Situations of this sort
provide the best case for strong paternalism, but are not directly considered by
the authors.
A related problem arises in the analysis of the duty of veracity in the chapter
on the physician-patient relationship. Although a strong argument is made that
deception, including lying, is not permissible in the therapeutic relationship, the
argument does not show that non-deceptive withholding of certain information is
not sometimes morally justified. (Cf. the above examples.)
Other discussions provide an insightful clarification of issues, but are less conclusive. In chapter six, for example, a helpful distinction is drawn among six
different levels on which decisions regarding the just macro-allocation of health
care monies must be made. No definitive theory of justice in macro-allocation is
offered, but this suggests the complexity of the issues rather than any failing by
the authors. What they do accomplish is a fine analysis of the various dimensions
of the problem of justice a nd the distribution of health care goods.
In the final analysis , Principles of Biomedical Ethics offers the reader just what
its title suggests - a useful framework of moral principles and distinctions 'for
assessing moral issues in medicine. But the details of application, particularly as
they relate to the role of the health care professional in the therapeutic relationship, remain to be worked out to the full satisfaction of ethicists and clinicians
alike.
- Terrence F. Ackerman, Ph.D.
University of Tennessee Center for the Health Sciences
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